SSL/TLS Vulnerability Checkers

Test for BEAST, POODLE, DROWN, ROBOT, and CRIME vulnerabilities

About SSL/TLS Vulnerability Checkers

Our comprehensive SSL/TLS Vulnerability Checker scans your server for five of the most significant cryptographic attacks: BEAST (CVE-2011-3389), POODLE (CVE-2014-3566), DROWN (CVE-2016-0800), ROBOT (CVE-2017-17382), and CRIME (CVE-2012-4929). Each test checks for specific protocol weaknesses or implementation flaws that could compromise your encrypted communications.

How to Use

1Enter the domain name you want to scan for vulnerabilities.
2Click "Run All Checks" to test against all five known vulnerabilities.
3Review the results and apply the recommended mitigations for any vulnerable components.

Use Cases

•Run comprehensive vulnerability scans before security audits
•Verify that patches for known CVEs have been properly applied
•Test legacy systems still supporting older TLS and SSL protocols
•Meet compliance requirements for PCI DSS, HIPAA, and SOC 2

Frequently Asked Questions

BEAST (Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS) targets TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 protocol vulnerabilities in CBC mode ciphers. Mitigation requires disabling TLS 1.0 or using RC4 (now also deprecated).

DROWN (Decrypting RSA with Obsolete and Weakened eNcryption) exploits servers that support SSLv2 to decrypt modern TLS connections. Disabling SSLv2 on all servers eliminates this attack.

Yes, and a misconfigured server is often vulnerable in several ways at once because the causes overlap. Offering an old protocol version, a weak cipher and no revocation checking all tend to appear together on a server nobody has looked at in years, and each one masks the others in a single-number score. Running all five checks gives you the individual findings rather than an average, which is what lets you put the exploitable ones first and ignore the cosmetic ones.

Because the attacks all depend on conditions TLS 1.3 removed. CBC suites are gone, RSA key exchange is gone, SSL 2.0 and 3.0 are gone, and compression is gone. A server negotiating 1.3 clears the list structurally rather than by configuration accident, which is why the single most effective remediation for almost any finding here is enabling 1.3 and disabling everything older.

It means the negotiated connection is not exposed to these five specific attacks under normal conditions. Exploitation of BEAST, POODLE and CRIME generally requires an attacker who can observe traffic and induce chosen requests, so most results reflect genuine exposure to the protocol rather than likelihood of attack. For a complete picture, pair this with the protocol downgrade and cipher checks.

They share the CBC requirement but differ in what else they need. BEAST needs CBC under TLS 1.0 specifically, while POODLE applies across 1.0 and 1.1 and to any TLS connection where the protocol tolerates padding quirks. A server restricted to TLS 1.2 with CBC suites can therefore be clear of BEAST and still flagged for POODLE, which is why each check is evaluated separately.

By removing every legacy protocol from the endpoint, since DROWN works through any shared weakness in an old protocol offered alongside modern TLS. In practice that means disabling SSLv2 and SSLv3 everywhere the same certificate or key is used, including less obvious places such as mail servers, IMAP endpoints and internal services sharing a key. Confirm afterwards with the downgrade page that each old version now fails.

The attack needs compression enabled on a connection that also carries a secret, so it matters most where responses include authenticated tokens. The single fix is disabling TLS compression, which is off by default in current clients and servers — the finding generally appears on older setups or where compression was explicitly re-enabled. Application-level compression of HTTP bodies is unrelated and does not create this exposure.

What the Checkers Cover

Five named protocol attacks are checked against one live handshake. Each verdict is derived from the protocol version and cipher suite the server actually negotiated, which is the right basis: an attack that targets a CBC suite cannot apply when the server selected an AEAD one.

1BEAST targets CBC suites in TLS 1.0 through a chosen-plaintext split attack. It needs both an old protocol and a CBC cipher, so either condition missing clears the server.
2POODLE also needs CBC, plus a protocol that lets it downgrade or lacks proper padding. TLS 1.3 removed both problems outright, which is why a 1.3 server is categorically clear.
3DROWN exploits legacy SSL 2.0 to decrypt TLS traffic. It is relevant wherever an old protocol is still offered anywhere on the same endpoint.
4ROBOT removes the randomness from RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 handshakes, exposing the premaster secret. Modern suites use ephemeral key exchange, which removes the precondition.
5CRIME compresses application data alongside the secret, letting an attacker who can trigger requests of chosen size recover it. It needs compression enabled on a connection carrying a secret.

Verdicts describe what the negotiated connection is exposed to, not whether an attack is being attempted. A clean result on all five with TLS 1.3 is a genuine pass; a finding on one usually disappears by disabling the old protocol it depends on.

Tips & Best Practices

•Run vulnerability checks regularly to identify security issues
•Address critical vulnerabilities immediately
•Use vulnerability results to prioritize security remediation
•Document vulnerability scan results for compliance evidence

Technical Details

Vulnerabilities: Heartbleed, POODLE, DROWN, ROBOT, and more
Checks: CVE-based vulnerability detection and assessment
Criticality: Vulnerability severity rating and prioritization
Output: Vulnerability report with remediation recommendations